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 1 Introduction
This paper examines the potential welfare and redistributive eﬀects of a hy-
pothetical increase in the petrol excise tax in New Zealand. Equivalent vari-
ations and excess burdens are obtained for a variety of household types at a
range of total expenditure levels. Households are divided into a number of
categories according to their composition. Also, overall summary measures of
the distributional eﬀects are reported using a money metric utility measure.
Changes in indirect taxes give rise to changes in prices, assuming tax shifting
to consumers, so the core of the modelling involves a method of examining
the welfare eﬀects of price changes. Household demand responses to price
changes are modelled using the linear expenditure system (LES), with the
modiﬁcation that parameters are allowed to vary by total expenditure level
and household characteristics.1
The data and household groups used are described in section 2. The more
technical material on welfare measurement and the way in which household
demands are modelled is placed in an Appendix. This includes the money
metric utility measure and the computation of the required parameter values.
Section 3 describes the relationship between tax rates and price changes. This
is complicated in the present context by the fact that the goods and services
tax (GST) is imposed on the excise-inclusive price, and the excise is a unit
tax rather than an ad valorem tax. The approach is used in section 4 to
examine the potential implications of a tax reform involving an increase in
the petrol excise tax. Conclusions are in section 5.
2T h e D a t a
This section describes the data used and the aggregation into household
groups. Household expenditure data from the Household Economic Survey
1There are well-known potential problems associated with using an assumption of addi-
tivity, as discussed by Deaton (1974), although these are less severe when broad commodity
groups are used.
2(HES) for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 2001 were adjusted to 2001
prices using the consumer price index (CPI). Over this period there were very
few changes in indirect taxes. The surveys were then pooled to form one large
data base, for purposes of estimating the relationships between budget shares
and total household expenditure for a range of household types.
Table 1 shows the household types used.2 In each case households are fur-
ther divided into smoking (S) and non-smoking (NS) households; a positive
weekly expenditure on tobacco (group 17 in Table 2) was suﬃcient for the
household to be designated as a smoking household. The division into smok-
ing and non-smoking households, for examination of all commodity groups,
was found to improve the goodness of ﬁto fm o s to ft h eb u d g e ts h a r er e l a t i o n -
ships substantially.3 Table 1 also give the arithmetic mean total household
expenditure for each household type.
3 Indirect Taxes and Price Changes
This section describes the 2001 indirect tax structure and the link between
excise tax changes and proportional price changes, on the assumption that
tax increases are fully passed to consumers. Two issues are involved. First,
it is necessary to express all indirect taxes in terms of a tax-exclusive ad
valorem tax rate. While this is straightforward for most commodity groups,
for which only GST applies, the translation is more awkward where an excise
tax is also imposed, since these are typically based on units of the commodity
rather than values.
It is not possible, mainly because of estimation diﬃculties, to use all
the separate and highly detailed HES commodity categories. Instead, these
were consolidated into 22 groups. Table 2 shows the commodity groups used
and the eﬀective ad valorem tax-exclusive percentage rates, at 2001. The
rates shown in Table 2 were taken from Young (2002). Where several HES
categories were combined, the eﬀective rates also required the computation
of a weighted average of the individual components. Table 2 clearly indicates
2For the ﬁrst two types, the age refers to that of the ‘head’ of the household.
3This is the relationship in equation (18) in the Appendix.
3Table 1: Household Categories
No. Household Type Number of Mean total
households expenditure
S N-S S N-S
1 65+ single 161 1282 267 274
2 65+ couple 224 1191 498 540
3 Single - no children 384 1098 406 437
4 Single - 1 child 148 239 400 403
5 Single - 2 children 148 181 428 438
6 Single - 3 children 59 75 468 475
7 Single - 4+ children 33 39 501 539
8 Couple - no children 966 2036 690 766
9 Couple - 1 child 381 643 668 763
10 Couple - 2 children 435 916 707 896
11 Couple - 3 children 207 458 805 844
12 Couple - 4+ children 98 195 673 822
13 3 adults - no children 319 456 975 992
14 3 adults - 1 child 122 157 898 1038
15 3 adults - 2+ children 117 34 826 920
16 4+ adults - no children 179 192 1311 1282
17 4+ adults - 1 child 65 60 1110 1129
18 4+ adults - 2+ children 47 47 1070 925
4Table 2: Commodity Groups and Tax Rates
No. Tax Rate Commodity Group HES Categories
1 12.5 Food 00-08
2 12.5 Food outside home 10
30 R e n t 1 1
4 12.5 Pay to Local Authorities 13
5 12.5 House maintenance 15-17
6 12.5 Domestic fuel and power 18-30
7 12.5 Household equipment 31-32
8 12.5 Furnishings 33-36
9 12.5 Household services 37-38
10 12.5 Adult clothing 39-40,42-45,47-48
11 12.5 Children’s clothing 41,46
12 12.5 Public transport in NZ 49
13 0 Overseas travel 50
14 7.05445 Vehicle purchase 51-53
15 71.776 Petrol etc 54-59
16 12.5 Vehicle supplies, parts etc 60-69
17 239.845 Cigarettes and tobacco 70-73
18 46.8191 Alcohol 74-85
19 12.5 Medical, cosmetic etc 86-88
20 12.5 Services 94-101
21 6.25 Recreational vehicles 58
22 12.5 Other expenditure 89-91,102
the high eﬀective rates on petrol, cigarettes and tobacco and alcohol. These
high rates are typically rationalised on merit good and externality grounds.4
It is required to calculate the tax-exclusive price and the eﬀective ad val-
orem tax rate on petrol, given information about the consumer price (which
is tax-inclusive) of petrol per litre, along with the excise per litre and the
GST rate. This is partly complicated by the fact that the excise tax is a
unit tax and GST is imposed on the excise. Hence an increase in the excise
automatically increases the absolute amount of GST raised per litre of petrol.
Let P0 and P1 denote the tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive price of petrol
per litre. The petrol excise per litre is E, and the GST (tax-exclusive ad
4For a case study of alcohol, see Barker (2002).
5valorem)r a t ei sg. The tax paid per litre, T, is given by:
T = E +( P0 + E)g
= E (1 + g)+P0g (1)
Hence the relationship between P1 and P0, assuming that the tax is passed
to consumers, is:






The eﬀective ad valorem rate, t, is therefore given by T/P0,o r :




For example, in 2001 the petrol excise was $0.343 per litre, and the pro-
portional GST rate was 0.125. Suppose the consumer price of petrol was
$1.08. Hence from (3) the tax-exclusive price was $0.617. From (4) the eﬀec-
tive ad valorem tax rate on petrol was 0.75. An increase in the excise by 5
cents per litre, to $0.393, produces an eﬀective tax rate of 0.842; an increase
by 10 cents produces a rate of 0.933; and an increase of 15 cents gives an
eﬀe c t i v er a t eo f1 . 0 2 4 .
Table 2 indicates that in estimating the budget share relationship for
each household type, it was necessary to group the HES categories 54 to 59.
This combines petrol with diesel, CNG and LPG. Hence the appropriate tax
rate for this combination requires a weighted average of petrol and other fuel
taxes. The basic (year 2001) rate used for this group is thus 0.71776, which is
correspondingly lower than the eﬀective rate of 0.75 on petrol. For an increase
of 5 cents in the excise, the new eﬀective rate for this commodity group
becomes 0.787, and for an increase of 15 cents the eﬀective rate becomes
0.952. The results reported below are obtained using these values.
Changes in eﬀective rates must then be translated into proportionate
price change. In general, suppose that the tax-exclusive ad valorem tax rate
imposed on good i is denoted ti, which is equivalent to a tax-inclusive rate
6of ti/(1 + ti). The revenue, Ri, f r o mt h ei n d i r e c tt a xo nt h eith good is
simply expenditure multiplied by the tax-inclusive rate. If ti increases at the
proportional rate ˙ ti, the resulting proportionate increase in the price of the
ith good, ˙ pi, is given by:






The price changes can then be fed into the expressions for the welfare changes
given in the Appendix.5
4 Simulation Results
This section reports the main results of simulations of the potential eﬀects of
an increase in the petrol excise tax in New Zealand. Two cases are considered,
of 5 and 15 cent increases. The relationship between the excise tax and the
eﬀective ad valorem tax rate is examined in the ﬁrst subsection. This is
followed by discussion of the numerical results.
4.1 Welfare Changes
The welfare change obtained for each household is the equivalent variation,
EV. This is the diﬀerence between total expenditure, y,w h i c hr e m a i n s
unchanged by assumption, and the expenditure that would be needed to
place the household at the new level of utility at the old (pre-change) prices.
Since the pre-change prices are lower, and households are worse oﬀ as a result
of the increase, the equivalent variation must be positive.
Tables 3 to 6 summarise the welfare changes resulting from the two hy-
pothetical excise tax changes, for the various household types. The ﬁrst two
tables refer to households with positive expenditure on tobacco, while the
second two tables are for non-smoking households. For each household type,
the welfare changes are given for three diﬀerent levels of total household ex-
penditure per week. The respective average expenditure levels are shown in
Table 1, in section 2 above.
5The Appendix also gives further details of the relationship between prices changes and
the expressions required for computing equivalent variations.
7The equivalent variation is given along with the ratio to total expenditure.
The variation in EV/y with y gives an initial idea of whether the tax change is
progressive or regressive: a progressive change is associated with an increase
in EV/y with y. It can be seen that for many household types, the change is
very slightly progressive. In some cases it appears to be slightly regressive,
while in some case the change in EV/y is not monotonic.6 The welfare losses
are typically a small percentage of total expenditure, but are relatively higher
for smoking households and for multi-adult households.
The columns headed ∆t give the increase in tax paid per week. The
marginal excess burdens arising from the policy change can therefore be
obtained by subtracting ∆t from EV, for each household type and total
expenditure level. The tables show that the marginal excess burden per dollar
of extra tax revenue varies substantially among the household types and total
expenditure levels. However, for most cases the variation lies between about
35 cents and 55 cents per dollar of additional revenue. It is widely recognised
that excess burdens are approximately proportional to the square of the
tax rate, and the present simulations involve non-marginal increases to an
eﬀective tax rate that is already very high, second only to that imposed on
alcohol.
The excess burdens found here are substantially higher than those re-
ported by Davies (2003). However, Davies computed an approximation (the
consumers’ surplus triangle) to the welfare change, based on an own-price
elasticity for the aggregate market demand curve. Even where an approxi-
mation is used, the appropriate demand curve is not the market (Marshallian)
curve but the Hicksian (or compensated) demand curve.7 This excess burden
is known to be an unreliable approximation.8
6The following subsection examines this issue in more detail.
7It seems that an income term was not included in the demand study from which Davies
took his elasticity, so ‘exact’ measures cannot be computed by appropriate integration of
the demand curve.
8For an introductory exposition of excess burden concepts, see Creedy (2003).
8Table 3: Welfare Changes for Smoking Households: Types 1-9
5 cents 15 cents
HH Type yE V E V / y ∆tE V E V / y ∆t
1 300 0.25 0.0008 0.16 0.81 0.0027 0.53
6 0 00 . 6 50 . 0 0 1 10 . 4 22 . 1 20 . 0 0 3 51 . 3 5
1000 1.45 0.0015 0.87 4.73 0.0047 2.77
2 300 0.46 0.0015 0.32 1.50 0.005 1.06
600 0.9 0.0015 0.66 2.98 0.005 2.16
1000 1.48 0.0015 1.05 4.90 0.0049 3.45
3 300 0.42 0.0014 0.29 1.39 0.0046 0.95
6 0 00 . 9 00 . 0 0 1 50 . 6 32 . 9 70 . 0 0 4 92 . 0 6
1000 1.58 0.0016 1.09 5.21 0.0052 3.55
4 300 0.41 0.0014 0.29 1.36 0.0045 0.95
600 0.80 0.0013 0.6 2.64 0.0044 1.96
1000 1.28 0.0013 0.9 4.23 0.0042 2.97
5 300 0.42 0.0014 0.29 1.37 0.0046 0.94
6 0 00 . 8 90 . 0 0 1 50 . 6 32 . 9 50 . 0 0 4 92 . 0 6
1000 1.63 0.0016 1.08 5.36 0.0054 3.5
6 300 0.28 0.0009 0.16 0.91 0.003 0.52
6 0 00 . 6 90 . 0 0 1 10 . 4 82 . 2 60 . 0 0 3 81 . 5 5
1000 1.29 0.0013 0.84 4.25 0.0042 2.74
7 3 0 0- --- --
600 0.75 0.0013 0.43 2.42 0.004 1.33
1000 1.83 0.0018 1.12 5.95 0.0059 3.56
8 3 0 00 . 6 1 0 . 0 0 20 . 4 32 . 0 00 . 0 0 6 71 . 4 1
600 1.08 0.0018 0.83 3.58 0.006 2.74
1000 1.44 0.0014 1.18 4.81 0.0048 3.93
9 300 0.56 0.0019 0.41 1.86 0.0062 1.33
6 0 01 . 0 70 . 0 0 1 80 . 7 83 . 5 30 . 0 0 5 92 . 5 7
1000 1.71 0.0017 1.24 5.65 0.0056 4.08
9Table 4: Welfare Changes for Smoking Households: Types 10-18
5 cents 15 cents
HH Type yE V E V / y ∆tE V E V / y ∆t
1 0 3 0 00 . 5 70 . 0 0 1 90 . 3 81 . 8 80 . 0 0 6 31 . 2 3
6 0 01 . 0 10 . 0 0 1 70 . 7 83 . 3 70 . 0 0 5 62 . 5 7
1000 1.41 0.0014 1.13 4.71 0.0047 3.78
1 1 3 0 00 . 7 80 . 0 0 2 60 . 5 62 . 5 80 . 0 0 8 61 . 8 6
6 0 01 . 1 30 . 0 0 1 90 . 9 03 . 7 80 . 0 0 6 33 . 0 0
1000 1.44 0.0014 1.19 4.82 0.0048 3.97
1 2 3 0 00 . 5 60 . 0 0 1 90 . 3 41 . 8 30 . 0 0 6 11 . 0 8
6 0 01 . 2 60 . 0 0 2 10 . 9 44 . 1 70 . 0 0 6 93 . 1 0
1000 1.71 0.0017 1.42 5.74 0.0057 4.73
1 3 3 0 00 . 5 70 . 0 0 1 90 . 3 41 . 8 40 . 0 0 6 11 . 0 6
6 0 01 . 2 50 . 0 0 2 10 . 9 14 . 1 20 . 0 0 6 93 . 0 0
1000 1.81 0.0018 1.44 6.04 0.006 4.78
1 4 3 0 00 . 8 80 . 0 0 2 90 . 6 82 . 9 40 . 0 0 9 82 . 2 5
6 0 01 . 2 80 . 0 0 2 11 . 0 14 . 2 60 . 0 0 7 13 . 3 5
1000 1.68 0.0017 1.35 5.61 0.0056 4.48
1 5 3 0 0- --- --
600 1.29 0.0022 0.83 4.22 0.007 2.66
1000 2.11 0.0021 1.62 7.02 0.007 5.37
1 6 3 0 00 . 4 70 . 0 0 1 60 . 4 61 . 5 30 . 0 0 5 11 . 4 7
6 0 01 . 6 00 . 0 0 2 71 . 2 05 . 2 80 . 0 0 8 83 . 9 5
1000 2.22 0.0022 1.79 7.39 0.0074 5.95
1 7 3 0 00 . 8 10 . 0 0 2 70 . 4 92 . 6 40 . 0 0 8 81 . 5 6
6 0 01 . 8 10 . 0 0 3 01 . 3 25 . 9 60 . 0 0 9 94 . 3 2
1000 2.68 0.0027 2.09 8.92 0.0089 6.91
18 300 1.05 0.0035 0.83 3.5 0.0117 2.77
6 0 01 . 5 10 . 0 0 2 51 . 1 95 . 0 20 . 0 0 8 43 . 9 3
1000 2.09 0.0021 1.61 6.94 0.0069 5.32
10Table 5: Welfare Changes for Non-smoking Households: Types 1-9
5 cents 15 cents
HH Type yE V E V / y ∆tE V E V / y ∆t
1 300 0.26 0.0009 0.19 0.87 0.0029 0.64
6 0 00 . 5 20 . 0 0 0 90 . 3 81 . 7 30 . 0 0 2 91 . 2 4
1000 0.92 0.0009 0.63 3.02 0.003 2.05
2 300 0.45 0.0015 0.34 1.49 0.005 1.11
6 0 00 . 8 30 . 0 0 1 40 . 6 52 . 7 50 . 0 0 4 62 . 1 4
1000 1.11 0.0011 0.92 3.70 0.0037 3.06
3 300 0.50 0.0017 0.38 1.66 0.0055 1.26
6 0 00 . 7 90 . 0 0 1 30 . 6 42 . 6 40 . 0 0 4 42 . 1 4
1000 0.96 0.001 0.82 3.22 0.0032 2.77
4 300 0.46 0.0015 0.36 1.52 0.0051 1.19
6 0 00 . 7 10 . 0 0 1 20 . 5 62 . 3 70 . 0 0 3 91 . 8 4
1000 1.01 0.001 0.74 3.37 0.0034 2.46
5 300 0.40 0.0013 0.35 1.36 0.0045 1.17
6 0 00 . 7 10 . 0 0 1 20 . 4 82 . 3 30 . 0 0 3 91 . 5 4
1000 1.79 0.0018 0.93 5.8 0.0058 2.96
6 300 0.34 0.0011 0.26 1.12 0.0037 0.85
6 0 00 . 6 60 . 0 0 1 10 . 4 62 . 1 80 . 0 0 3 61 . 4 8
1000 1.37 0.0014 0.83 4.49 0.0045 2.68
7 300 0.53 0.0018 0.41 1.76 0.0059 1.35
600 0.78 0.0013 0.7 2.64 0.0044 2.35
1000 0.67 0.0007 0.6 2.25 0.0023 2.04
8 3 0 00 . 6 0 0 . 0 0 20 . 4 51 . 9 70 . 0 0 6 61 . 4 8
6 0 01 . 0 40 . 0 0 1 70 . 8 23 . 4 50 . 0 0 5 72 . 7 2
1000 1.33 0.0013 1.12 4.46 0.0045 3.75
9 300 0.64 0.0021 0.5 2.13 0.0071 1.66
600 0.99 0.0016 0.78 3.30 0.0055 2.6
1000 1.33 0.0013 1.06 4.44 0.0044 3.53
11Table 6: Welfare Changes for Non-smoking Households: Types 10-18
5 cents 15 cents
HH Type yE V E V / y ∆tE V E V / y ∆t
1 0 3 0 00 . 6 80 . 0 0 2 30 . 5 22 . 2 50 . 0 0 7 51 . 7 2
6 0 01 . 0 40 . 0 0 1 70 . 8 33 . 4 70 . 0 0 5 82 . 7 6
1000 1.34 0.0013 1.11 4.48 0.0045 3.69
1 1 3 0 00 . 6 00 . 0 0 2 00 . 4 72 . 0 00 . 0 0 6 71 . 5 4
6 0 01 . 0 10 . 0 0 1 70 . 8 13 . 3 70 . 0 0 5 62 . 6 8
1000 1.26 0.0013 1.07 4.23 0.0042 3.59
1 2 3 0 00 . 5 60 . 0 0 1 90 . 3 91 . 8 40 . 0 0 6 11 . 2 8
6 0 00 . 9 80 . 0 0 1 60 . 7 73 . 2 50 . 0 0 5 42 . 5 4
1000 1.28 0.0013 1.05 4.29 0.0043 3.52
1 3 3 0 00 . 6 20 . 0 0 2 10 . 4 32 . 0 40 . 0 0 6 81 . 3 9
6 0 01 . 2 80 . 0 0 2 10 . 9 84 . 2 40 . 0 0 7 13 . 2 2
1000 1.75 0.0017 1.44 5.85 0.0058 4.80
1 4 3 0 00 . 8 70 . 0 0 2 90 . 6 32 . 8 80 . 0 0 9 62 . 0 8
600 1.38 0.0023 1.09 4.6 0.0077 3.62
1000 1.77 0.0018 1.48 5.95 0.0059 4.94
1 5 3 0 00 . 3 50 . 0 0 1 20 . 1 71 . 1 20 . 0 0 3 70 . 5 2
6 0 01 . 0 50 . 0 0 1 80 . 7 53 . 4 60 . 0 0 5 82 . 4 6
1000 1.62 0.0016 1.26 5.39 0.0054 4.16
1 6 3 0 00 . 4 20 . 0 0 1 40 . 2 81 . 3 60 . 0 0 4 50 . 8 6
6 0 01 . 2 50 . 0 0 2 10 . 9 04 . 1 20 . 0 0 6 92 . 9 4
1000 1.91 0.0019 1.48 6.35 0.0064 4.90
1 7 3 0 00 . 5 40 . 0 0 1 80 . 3 31 . 7 60 . 0 0 5 91 . 0 4
6 0 01 . 2 90 . 0 0 2 20 . 9 44 . 2 60 . 0 0 7 13 . 0 7
1000 1.97 0.002 1.51 6.56 0.0066 4.98
1 8 3 0 00 . 9 70 . 0 0 3 20 . 7 53 . 2 20 . 0 1 0 72 . 4 7
6 0 01 . 4 60 . 0 0 2 41 . 1 64 . 8 70 . 0 0 8 13 . 8 6
1000 1.93 0.0019 1.56 6.46 0.0065 5.18
124.2 Inequality Measures
In the previous subsection it was suggested that the variation in EV/y as
y increases gives an indication of whether the tax change is progressive or
regressive. However, this indication is incomplete because it does not re-
ﬂect information about the distribution of changes, involving the numbers
of households at the various total expenditure levels. Furthermore, it only
allows comparisons between households in the same demographic group.
The redistributive eﬀect of the tax change can be examined using the
distribution of money metric utility, ye,b e f o r ea n da f t e rt h ee x c i s ei n c r e a s e .
A suitable money metric is deﬁned as the value of total expenditure, ye,
which, at some reference set of prices, pr, would give the same utility as the
actual total expenditure.9 For present purposes, the pre-change prices are
used as the reference prices.
An important feature of the inequality measures is that they refer to the
inequality of individual (money metric) utilities, where each individual in a
household is given that household’s value of z = ye/h, where h is the adult
equivalent size. The inequality measure reported is the Atkinson measure,








where pi is the number of individuals in the ith household (i =1 ,...,n)a n d
V (z) is increasing and concave.10 Inequality is deﬁned as the proportional
diﬀerence between the equally-distributed-equivalent, e z, and the arithmetic
mean, z.H e n c e , e z i st h em o n e ym e a s u r ep e re q u i v a l e n ta d u l tw h i c h ,i f






9It is deﬁned more precisely in the Appendix. Such a measure was used by Fortin and
Truchan (1993) with the LES and an early brief discussion of this money metric, also using
the LES, was provided by Roberts (1980).
10Hence for computing the inequality measure, the household distribution is treated as
being weighted, with each household given a frequency corresponding to the total number
of people in the household.





where ε 6=1is the degree of constant relative inequality aversion of the












The coeﬃcient ε 6=1is a measure of relative inequality aversion which,
as the degree of concavity of x1−ε/(1 − ε), reﬂects the judge’s view of the
‘wastefulness’ of inequality. The value of ε is often linked to a judge’s toler-
ance of the loss involved (using a ‘leaky bucket’) in making a transfer from
a richer to a poorer individual.11
Equivalence scales are based on the following function:
h =( na + θnc)
γ (10)
where na and nc respectively are the number of adults and children in the
household. The parameter θ measures the ‘size’ of children relative to adults,
and the term γ reﬂects economies of scale in consumption. On the use of
this form, see Jenkins and Cowell (1994, p.894). The following results were
obtained using values of θ =0 .3 and γ =0 .7.
Table 7 lists the pre- and post-increase inequality measures for each house-
hold type, for the higher excise increase of 15 cents. for a relative inequality
aversion coeﬃcient of 1.2. This indicates a substantial degree of aversion.
Within many of the demographic groups, the choice of adult equivalence
scales do not aﬀect the inequality comparison because those groups con-
tain homogeneous households. But for categories 7, 13 and 15-18, the adult
equivalent household size can vary.









. Hence, if j has twice
the income of i,av a l u eo fε =1means that the judge is prepared to take $1 from j and
transfer only 50 cents to i, losing the remaining 50 cents. For survey results on attitudes
to inequality, producing values of ε substantially below 1, see Amiel et al. (1999).
14The ﬁnal row of the table provides an overall indication of the redistribu-
tive eﬀect of the tax change; this shows a very small increase from 0.1622 to
0.1627. This overall change also reﬂects the relative numbers of households
in the various demographic groups, as well as the distribution of total ex-
penditure among households. When a lower degree of inequality aversion is
used, the overall increase is trivial, being from 0.0297 to 0.0298.12
When the inequality of individual values of ye/h is considered the overall
eﬀect is to increase inequality slightly. Furthermore, inequality increases
slightly within most of the demographic groups, the exceptions being 1, 3,
and 6-7 inclusive for the smoking households and groups 1 and 6 for the non-
smoking households. However, these changes in inequality are negligible,
typically involving either the third or fourth decimal place, and are most
unlikely to be statistically signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the potential implications for New Zealand house-
holds of a hypothetical increase in the petrol excise tax. Two cases were
considered of a 5 cents and 15 cents increase per litre. Changes in indirect
taxes lead to changes in prices, so the core of the model is a method of ex-
amining the welfare eﬀects of price changes. Household demand responses
to price changes were modelled using the linear expenditure system, with
the modiﬁcation that parameters vary by total expenditure level and house-
hold characteristics. Pooled Household Economic Survey data were used to
divide households into 18 demographic categories, and commodity groups
were consolidated into 22 groups. In addition, households were distinguished
according to whether their tobacco consumption was positive.
The welfare eﬀects of the excise tax increase were found to vary consider-
ably among demographic groups, reﬂecting the diﬀerent variations in budget
shares with total expenditure. Importantly the excess burdens also varied
12A wide range of inequality measures, included extended Gini measures for varying
inequality aversion, was computed, and in all cases the changes were very small. The
comparisons were also not aﬀected by the choice of equivalence scale in this case, though
the absolute size changes (except for single adult households, of course).
15Table 7: Inequality Measures for Excise Increase of 15 Cents
No. Household Type Inequality Measure
Smoking Non-Smoking
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
1 65+ single .1553 .1551 .1692 .1692
2 65+ couple .1012 .1012 .1728 .1731
3 Single - no children .1804 .1802 .1928 .1933
4 Single - 1 child .0876 .0876 .1310 .1314
5 Single - 2 children .1027 .1026 .1318 .1318
6 Single - 3 children .1140 .1137 .1270 .1269
7 Single - 4+ children .0696 .0690 .1126 .1131
8 Couple - no children .1285 .1290 .1670 .1677
9 Couple - 1 child .1236 .1238 .1657 .1664
10 Couple - 2 children .1072 .1076 .1749 .1757
11 Couple - 3 children .1656 .1666 .1463 .1470
12 Couple - 4+ children .1207 .1210 .1381 .1386
1 3 3a d u l t s-n oc h i l d r e n . 1354 .1360 .1387 .1394
14 3 adults - 1 child .1284 .1291 .1387 .1396
15 3 adults - 2+ children .1173 .1174 .1409 .1412
16 4+ adults - no children .1114 .1121 .1121 .1125
17 4+ adults - 1 child .1120 .1127 .2092 .2095
18 4+ adults - 2+ children .1683 .1689 .1738 .1748
All Individuals Pre: 0.1622 Post: 0.1627
16substantially, though most cases ranged between about 35 and 55 cents per
dollar of extra revenue. Public expenditure ﬁnanced from such a tax increase
would therefore need to establish signiﬁcant external beneﬁts.
Inequality comparisons, based on money metric utility per adult equiv-
alent, were also made based on the distribution of individual values. The
majority of household types, along with the overall comparison, showed very
small - indeed negligible - increases in inequality. The results suggest that
the most important consideration from such a selective tax increase arises
from the marginal excess burdens generated.
17Appendix: Welfare Changes, Demand Elastic-
ities and Parameters
This appendix describes the computation of the welfare measures and the
method used to compute the required parameters for each demographic group
and total expenditure level. Only the main results are stated, as their deriva-
tions are available elsewhere.13 The basis of the approach is the use of the
linear expenditure system to model households’ behaviour. The demands are
assumed to vary in a partial equilibrium, rather than a general equilibrium,
context. The total expenditure (though not its composition) of each house-
hold is assumed to remain ﬁx e dw h e np r i c e so fg o o d sa n ds e r v i c e sc h a n g e .
Thus, possible changes in production (associated with the changing struc-
ture of demands) and factor prices, along with the distribution of income,
are ignored.14






with 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1, and
Pn
i=1 βi =1 . Here, xi and γi are respectively the total
and the committed consumption of good i. If pi is the price of good i, and
y is total household expenditure, the budget constraint is
Pn
i=1 pixi = y. In
the present context, the parameters of the utility function diﬀer according to
both household type and total expenditure, as discussed further below. The
next two subsections deﬁne equivalent variations and money metric utility,
which are used in distributional analyses.
Equivalent Variations
The equivalent variation, EV,i sd e ﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h ee x p e n d i t u r ef u n c t i o n
as EV = E (p1,U 1)−E (p0,U 1), where E (p,U) is the minimum expenditure
required to reach utility level U at prices p. Deﬁning the terms A and B
13For example, see Powell (1974), Allen (1975), Creedy (1998a,b).







βi, the indirect utility function,
V (p,y),i s :
V =( y − A)/B (12)
The expenditure function is found by inverting (12) and substituting E for
y to get:
E (p,U)=A + BU (13)
Suppose that the vector of prices changes from p0 to p1. Substituting
for E using (13) and assuming that total expenditure remains constant at y,
gives:
EV = y − (A0 + B0U1) (14)
Substituting for U1, using equation (12), into (14) gives:













The term A1/A0 is a Laspeyres type of price index, using γisa sw e i g h t s .
The term B1/B0 simpliﬁes to
Qn
i=1 (p1i/p0i)
βi , which is a weighted geometric
mean of price relatives.15 A convenient feature of the present approach is
that the expression for the equivalent variation requires only the percentage
changes in prices to be speciﬁed.
Money Metric Utility
For distributional analyses of tax reforms, it is necessary to have a money
metric measure of each household’s utility. A suitable money metric is deﬁned
as the value of total expenditure, ye, which, at some reference set of prices,
pr, would give the same utility as the actual total expenditure.16 Af e a t u r eo f
this metric is that it ensures that alternative situations are evaluated using a
common set of reference prices. It is, importantly, invariant with respect to
monotonic transformations of utility. Using the expenditure function gives:
ye = E (pr,V (p,y)) (16)
15The corresponding result for the compensating variation follows by substituting into
CV = E (p1,U 0) − E (p0,U 0).
16In terms of the indirect utility function, ye is deﬁned by V (pr,y e)=V (p,y). This
metric was called ‘equivalent income’ by King (1983), but this term can lead to confusion
when used in conjunction with adult equivalent scales.



















The eﬀect on welfare can be measured in terms of a change in ye from ye0
to ye1, where, as before, the indices 0 and 1 refer to pre- and post-change
values respectively. If pre-change prices are used as reference prices, so that
pri = p0i for all i, ye1 is simply the value of actual total expenditure after
the change less the value of the equivalent variation; that is, ye1 = y1 −EV.
Hence the proportionate change, (y1 − ye1)/y1, is conveniently the ratio of
EV to y1.
Total Expenditure Elasticities
Given cross-sectional budget data, the total expenditure elasticities, for dif-
ferent household types, can be obtained by ﬁrst estimating the relationship,
for each commodity group, between the budget shares and total household
expenditure. If wi = pixi/
Pn
i=1 pixi = pixi/y is the budget share of the ith
good, a ﬂexible speciﬁcation that has been found to provide a good ﬁti s
(omitting subscripts):17




This form has the convenient property that, if parameters are estimated
using ordinary least squares, the adding-up condition,
Pn
i=1 wi =1 , holds
for predicted shares, at all total expenditure levels, y.W i t h t h e l e v e l o f
disaggregation used, it was necessary to carry out a total of 792 (22×2×18)
budget share regressions. Hence these cannot be reported here.







17For further discussion of this form, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). One small
diﬃculty with the use of (18) is that ordinary least squares estimators do not guarantee
that predicted budget shares are always non-negative. In the few cases where this arises -
for very low y,t h eware replaced by zero, and others are adjusted to ensure additivity.
20which can be expressed as:
e =1+
(y/δ3)δ2 − 1
(y/δ3)(δ1 + δ2 logy)+1
(20)
so that e =0for y =0 , and converges to 1 as y →∞(though of course it
may exceed unity over certain ranges of y).
Demand Elasticities





Hence, given values of ei, calculated using (20), the corresponding value of
βi can easily be obtained using (21), as βi = eiwi.
Cross-sectional budget data do not provide direct information about price
responses. However, the own-price elasticities, eii, and cross-price elasticities,
eij, are obtained using a general property of directly additive utility functions.



















In these expressions, ξ denotes the elasticity of the marginal utility of to-
tal expenditure with respect to total expenditure; this is called the Frisch
parameter.
The computation of welfare changes does not actually require each value
of γi, but the value of piγi, the committed expenditure on good i.G i v e n
own-price elasticities of demand for each good at each income level, obtained
using (23), the committed expenditures can be obtained by making use of
the property of the linear expenditure system that:
eii =








Ad i ﬃculty is that household budget data cannot provide direct estimates
of the Frisch parameter. It is therefore necessary to make use of extraneous
information. The results reported above were obtained using a ﬁxed Frisch
parameter of -1.9.18
Experiments with varying Frisch parameters, allowing the absolute Frisch
to fall as total expenditure rises, showed that the results were not sensitive.
Hence only the constant case is reported here. Frisch (1959, p.189) himself
argued that the parameter would vary with income and some empirical sup-
port for this conjecture was found by Lluch et al. (1977). Sensitivity analyses
were carried out using a ﬂexible speciﬁcation which extends the logarithmic
form used by Lluch et al. (1977):
log(−ξ)=φ − αlog(y + θ) (26)
For the LES, it can be shown that −ξ = y/y∗, that is the ratio of total
expenditure to supernumerary expenditure. A falling absolute Frisch param-
eter with y means that total committed expenditure rises in absolute and
proportional terms as y increases. However, own-price elasticities may rise
or fall with y depending on variations in wi and ei as well as ξ.
Price Changes
In general the demand functions can be expressed as xi = xi (p1,...,pn |y).
Holding y constant and diﬀerentiating the demand for good i with respect




eij ˙ pj (27)
where the dots again indicate proportionate changes and eij is the elasticity of
demand for i with respect to a change in the price of good j. The proportional
18For a review of earlier estimates of the Frisch parameter, see Brown and Deaton
(1973). Tulpule and Powell (1978) used a value of ξ = −1.82 when calculating elasticities
at average income for Australia, based on work of Williams (1978), and this value was
adopted by Dixon et al. (1982) in calibrating a general equilibrium model.
22change in the budget share, ˙ wi, is:
˙ wi = ˙ pi +
n X
j=1
eij ˙ pj (28)
which, as total expenditure is ﬁxed, is equivalent to the proportional change
in expenditure on good i.
A convenient feature of the present approach is that the expression for
the equivalent variation requires only the percentage changes in prices to be
speciﬁed. The relevant terms can be expressed in terms of the ˙ ps. Since
p1i = p0i (1 + ˙ pi), and deﬁning si = p0iγi/
P
i p0iγi, it can be shown that
A1/A0 =1+
P
i si ˙ pi and B1/B0 =
Q
i (1 + ˙ pi)
βi. Suppose that all prices
change by the same proportion. If all prices change in the same proportion,
˙ pi = ˙ p for all i, and B1/B0 = A1/A0 =1+˙ p.
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